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Freedom of speech is such a fundamental aspect of a free society that it is often used as a measure by which a 
society or State can be considered ‘free.’ However, untrammelled freedom of speech can impact directly on the 
rights and freedoms of others, for example, by protecting hate speech and undermining the rights and freedoms 
of those who belong to minority groups. Article 10, as a qualified right, can be limited, but it is also the only 
article which mentions the concept of responsibility. This work examines the concept of responsibility under 
article 10, arguing that a greater focus on responsibility would enhance the coherence of the Court’s freedom of 
speech jurisprudence, which currently lacks clarity. The jurisprudence relating to article 10 is examined, as well 
as the silencing provisions of Article 17 of the Convention, which prevent the exercise of rights to defeat the ends 


























                                                          
∗  . 
I. Introduction 
 
Freedom of speech is such a fundamental part of a free society that it is often used as a key 
measure to assess the extent to which a State could be considered ‘free.’1 Indeed, authors such 
as Dworkin characterise freedom of speech as so critical to a free, democratic society that it 
should be an absolute right: his compelling argument is that political decisions could lack 
legitimacy should anyone be deprived of ‘a vote and a voice.’2 Following Dworkin’s line of 
argument, any restrictions on freedom of expression are automatically undemocratic, and limit 
one’s franchise within the democratic system. This perspective characterises freedom of 
speech as a right without responsibility; an entitlement without limits. However, with 
absolutism of this nature, hateful speech without any responsibility attached generates complex 
problems for a free and democratic society,3 and specifically for minority groups within 
populations.4 Thus, issues arise with unlimited freedom of speech, when that freedom is used 
to express oneself in a hateful manner, 5 particularly when such speech causes ‘factual harm’6 
to the rights and freedoms of others. Recognising the damage that such unlimited freedom 
could do to the system of human rights, as well as to the rights of individuals, the drafters of 
the European Convention on Human Rights enshrined the individual right to freedom of 
expression7 broadly and attached certain limitations. The right allows everyone to hold 
opinions and ideas, and to freely receive information and convey information, without any 
interference.8 Although drafted broadly, to protect the holding, expression, communication 
and broadcast of ideas, there are limitations presented within the article itself, allowing 
domestic authorities to restrict freedom of speech in cases where the right is being abused, or 
where the rights and freedoms of others are threatened: 
 
                                                          
1 See the Human Freedom Index 2019, published by the Cato Foundation, World Press Freedom Index,  
published by Reporters without Borders, and the annual reports published by Freedom House. 
2  J. Weinstein, ‘Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, and Political Legitimacy’ (2017) 32 Const. Comm. 527, 529. 
3  See E. Heinze, Viewpoint Absolutism and Hate Speech’ (2006) 69 M.L.R. 543. 
4  M. Cheema and A. Kamran, ‘The Fundamentalism of Liberal Rights: Decoding the Freedom of  
Expression under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms’ (2014) 11 LU. Ch. I.L.R. 79, 101. 
5  A. Stilz, ‘On democratic persuasion’ (2017) 82 Jurisprudence 342-351 and Erica Howard, ‘Freedom of  
Speech versus Freedom of Religion? The Case of Dutch Politician Geert Wilders’ (2017) 17 H.R.L.R. 313, 
337. 
E. Howard, ‘Freedom of Speech versus Freedom of Religion? The Case of Dutch Politician Geert Wilders’ 
(2017) 17 H.R.L.R. 313, 337. 
7  Article 10(1), European Convention on Human Rights 1950.  
8  Article 10(1), European Convention on Human Rights 1950. 
 “The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to 
 such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
 democratic society.”9   
 
Article 10 remains the only article in the Convention to reference the idea of the ‘responsibility’ 
that those who wish to exercise freedom of expression must carry. The notion of what this 
responsibility may entail is, as shall be discussed below, dealt with to an even lesser degree, 
with very limited examples, of cases which reference the idea of responsibility in the context 
of freedom of speech. Buyse describes the right to free speech as a ‘flexible membrane’ which 
can protect certain speech depending on the context and argues that balancing exercises are a 
necessary part of that freedom.10 These balancing exercises, however, have produced an 
interesting approach in the Court’s jurisprudence, from which few clear ideas can be drawn. 
Greater reference to the idea of responsibility could create a degree of coherence in the Court’s 
jurisprudence. The necessity of permitting speech which may ‘shock, offend or disturb’11 is 
balanced against the State’s power to restrict speech only where there is a ‘pressing social 
need’12 to do so. As demonstrated below, the responsibility of the individual claiming the right, 
however, has not been engaged greatly by the Court, and instead the focus remains on the 
contribution the speech or expression makes to the public debate and the ‘pressing social need’ 
for any restrictions. 
 
This work examines the concept of responsibility under article 10 and argues that a greater 
focus on responsibility would offer a degree of coherence in the Court’s jurisprudence, which 
currently lacks clarity. As will be demonstrated below, although the Court is certain as to when 
violations of article 10 have (and have not) been committed, its reasoning is sometimes vague 
and lacking justification. This work looks at the jurisprudence of article 10 and then the key 
criteria of incitement to violence and contribution to the public debate, which are key 
determinants when considering a potential breach of article 10, as well as how responsibility 
may help to clarify the Court’s approach. The silencing provisions of article 17, which prevents 
the exercise of any rights in order to defeat the ends of the Convention, and their use in cases 
concerning genocide denial, will also be explored to appreciate how responsibility may help to 





                                                          
9   Article 10(2), European Convention on Human Rights 1950. 
10  A. Buyse, ‘Words of Violence: Fear Speech, or How Violent Conflict Escalation Relates to the   
 Freedom of Expression’ (2014) 36 H.R.Q. 779, 795.  
11  Handyside v UK (1976) 1 E.H.R.R. 737. 
12  Sunday Times v UK (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 245. 
II. Freedom of speech under Article 10 
The restrictions on publication in the Sunday Times cases,13 for example, were deemed to be 
violations of article 1014 because the facts of the stories were already in the public domain. The 
first case, in 1979, concerned the settlements offered for children who were born with 
disabilities because their mothers had been prescribed thalidomide during pregnancy. The 
argument against publication was rejected on the grounds that the scandal was a significant 
issue of public concern, the facts of which were already known by the public, meaning that 
there was no ‘pressing social need’ to restrain publication. The second case involved the 
publication of the Spycatcher novels, which concern previously secret MI5 information. As 
the material was already in circulation in other countries, an injunction to prevent publication 
was deemed ineffectual, as the information was no longer confidential. In both cases, the Court 
acknowledged the responsibility on the newspaper to highlight and discuss issues of public 
concern in a responsible way: in the first case, the balanced nature of the reporting was 
commended. In the second, the material was no longer secret, as it had been published in other 
jurisdictions. Publication in the UK was therefore not considered irresponsible.15  
 
The equally significant Handyside16 judgment held that article 10 protected the right to ‘shock 
and disturb’ through the dissemination of information, although rejected the idea that it would 
also extend to information considered by the Director of Public Prosecutions in that case to 
be pornographic, noting that there could be a pressing social need for such restriction. Further 
detail on the concept of a pressing social need was offered by the case of Otto-Preminger-Institut 
v Austria17 in which government intervention was justified to protect from shock and offence 
its population, the majority of whom it considered to be offended by the circulation of a film 
which aimed to horrify Roman Catholics. Thus, restriction based on a ‘pressing social need’ 
must go beyond the merely offensive. These seminal cases demonstrate the basis for 
restrictions under article 10, but it must also be noted that the Convention, as a living 
instrument, may be interpreted differently over time. More recent case law, Pryanishnikov,18  
considered the compatibility of State restrictions on audio-visual licences for a producer of 
both pornographic and non-pornographic films, without which no film could be produced or 
distributed. The Court held such restrictions to be a violation of article 10, because of the 
effect such a restriction would have on the non-pornographic aspect of his business.19 
Interestingly, in this case, the Court determined that the measure had been disproportionate, 
                                                          
13  Sunday Times v UK (1979) 2 E.H.R.R. 245 and Sunday Times v UK (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 123, for example. 
14  Sunday Times v UK (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 123. 
15  Sunday Times v UK (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 123, para 66-68. 
 
16  Handyside v UK (1976) 1 E.H.R.R. 737. 
17 (1994) 19 E.H.R.R. 34. 
18  Pryanishnikov v Russia (App. No. 25047/05), judgment of 10th September 2017. 
19  Pryanishnikov v Russia (App. No. 25047/05), judgment of 10th September 2017. 
without engaging with the lack of contribution such expression makes to any public debate. 
Its reasoning was, instead, based on the extrapolated right to express oneself artistically: 
 
“The Court further reiterates that freedom of expression includes freedom of artistic expression – 
notably within freedom to receive and impart information and ideas – which affords the opportunity to 
take part in the public exchange of cultural, political and social information and ideas of all kinds. 
Those who create, perform, distribute or exhibit works of art contribute to the exchange of ideas and 
opinions which is essential for a democratic society. Hence the obligation on the State not to encroach 
unduly on their freedom of expression.”20 
 
Thus, the right to express oneself artistically is part of the right to freedom of expression. The 
case law on public debate is still relevant to the points made in these cases, in that there exists 
a right to shock and disturb with the dissemination of information and ideas, including when 
one is engaged in artistic expression.  
 
The shocking nature of certain expression remains protected in other areas, where the nature 
of the expression may have a connection to historic and current prejudices. In particular, the 
Court has held that an action taken against a journalist for the defamation of a politician, based 
on the journalist’s criticism of the politician’s accommodation of Nazis within Austrian 
politics, was censorious and a breach of article 10.21 In the context of Austrian politics, the 
discussion of such ideas and even the politicians themselves was held to be in the public 
interest, and necessary for the stimulation of public debate. Indeed, specific matters relevant 
to domestic issues in each country may render the expression specifically protected because of 
the way in which it facilitates ‘open discussion of matters of public concern,’22 particularly 
where this relates to political debate. In Thorgeirson,23 although the Court held that suppressing 
a journalist’s discussion of police brutality was not necessarily political discussion,24 a 
conviction for defamation was held to have violated article 10 because of the importance of 
the expression to the public debate in general. Interestingly, the Court also noted that the 
concept of ‘responsibility’ could not be used as a justification for restriction, unless the basis 
for the restriction could be found within article 10(2) of the Convention.25 The Court accepts 
that speech which shocks, with the potential to defame an individual’s reputation, should also 
                                                          
20  Pryanishnikov v Russia (App. No. 25047/05), judgment of 10th September 2017. 
 
21 Lingens v Austria (1986) E.H.R.R. 407.  
22  Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 483.  
23  Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 483. 
24  Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 483, para 61. 
25  Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 483, para 64. 
be protected by article 10 where there was a requirement of open and public debate on the 
matter.26  
 
There appear to be no common standards regarding the acceptability of restrictions across 
Europe, largely because of domestic context within which the restrictions have been evaluated. 
This has led to a degree of asymmetry across Europe, particularly where countries are treated 
differently with the margin of appreciation which each is afforded by the Court.27 However, it 
would also appear that different contexts are distinguished , and that the content of the speech 
is critical. A demonstration of the evolving context in which remarks are viewed is provided 
by Gunduz,28 in which the Court heard two separate claims regarding largely similar remarks 
from different periods in time. The first case concerned a newspaper article written in 1994, 
in which Gunduz had made remarks about moderate Islamic intellectuals in Turkey, noting 
that they were so hollow that ‘All that is needed now is for one brave man among the Muslims 
to plant a dagger in their soft underbelly and run them through twice with a bayonet to show 
just how empty they are.’29 He argued that his conviction under the Criminal Code for 
incitement to violence was a violation of article 10, but the Court declared his claim to be 
inadmissible,30 on the basis that restrictions on speech which ‘amount(ed) to hate speech or to 
glorification of or incitement to violence…cannot be regarded as compatible with the notion 
of tolerance’ in a plural society.31  
 
Gunduz’s second conviction was for inciting hostility and hatred against non-Muslims during 
a televised interview in 1995. Although the tone of the remarks was decidedly less violent than 
his articles, he remained constant in his support of an oppressive form of Sharia law, arguing 
that secularism was ‘hypocritical’ (although not really explaining why), agreeing with the 
violence against individuals who were openly secular at public institutions, and that children 
born of civil marriages would be considered illegitimate under Islamic law.32 He, again, raised 
a claim before the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that his conviction was in breach 
                                                          
26  Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 483, para 56. 
 
27 O. M. Arnardottir, ‘Res interpretata, erga omnes effect and the role of the margin of appreciation in  
giving domestic effect to the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2017) 28 E.J.I.L. 819. 
28  Gunduz v Turkey (App. No. 59745/00) Decision on admissibility of 13 November 2003; Gunduz v Turkey  
(2005) 41 E.H.R.R. 5. 
Gunduz v Turkey (App. No. 59745/00) Decision on admissibility of 13 November 2003, circumstances of 
the case. 
30   Gunduz v Turkey (App. No. 59745/00) Decision on admissibility of 13 November 2003. 
31  Gunduz v Turkey (App. No. 59745/00) Decision on admissibility of 13 November 2003, 1. 
32  Gunduz v Turkey (2005) 41 E.H.R.R. 5, 11. 
of article 10. The Court’s judgment echoed that of Otto-Preminger,33 noting that the exercise of 
article 10 was limited by the rights and freedoms of others, meaning that those exercising 
freedom of speech had ‘an obligation to avoid as far as possible expressions that are 
gratuitously offensive to others…and which therefore do not contribute to any form of public 
debate capable of furthering progress in human affairs.’ 34 More recently, the Court has rejected 
the right of individuals to make comments which constitute ‘an improper of even abusive 
attack on an object of religious veneration.’35 However, the Court concluded that this 
conviction constituted a violation of article 10. The judgment noted that gratuitously offensive 
speech should be avoided but stated that the nature of the programme was to present his views 
as a significant part of the relevant and topical public debate in Turkey at that time.  
 
In this context, it is evident that racist and sectarian forms of hate speech are not quite as 
restricted as one might assume in a system which seeks to balance the rights of freedoms of 
others against freedom of speech: the key question is the contribution such speech makes to 
the public debate, rather than the nature of the speech itself, and the likelihood of the speech 
inciting violence. The criteria must be balanced against one another: the importance of the 
public debate against the likelihood of the remarks sparking violence in their wake. Although 
only mentioned in some cases, the question of responsibility is an inherent part of the test of 
incitement to violence. The next part will assess the extent to which responsibility is considered 



















                                                          
33  Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria: (1995) 19 E.H.R.R. 34. 
 
34 Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria: (1995) 19 E.H.R.R. 34, 49. 
35  E.S. v Austria (App. No. 38450/12), Judgment of 25 October 2018, para 43. 
III. The public debate, incitement to violence and responsibility 
 
The issue of responsibility is tied to both the issue of public debate and the effect of the speech 
or expression on wider society, particularly that which relates to any incitement to violence. 
The contribution one makes to the debate must be balanced against the likelihood of 
incitement to violence, and thus the two tests - contribution to the debate and incitement to 
violence, - should be examined together to identify when article 10 may be justifiably restricted. 
Although there is a connection between hate speech and incitement to violence, the 
restrictions on the former are outweighed by the focus on the latter, as shall be demonstrated 
here. 
 
The likelihood of incitement to violence under article 10 is a key concern for the Court, which 
attempts to balance the idea of a varied, plural debate against the likelihood of the speech 
inciting violence. Interestingly, there is little reference to responsibility when determining 
whether the actions are likely to incite violence: in Erbakan,36 the Court considered a ban on 
speech which was likely to generate a ‘present risk’ or ‘imminent risk’ of inciting violence. The 
role of the individuals who were speaking was key, as well as the time lapse between speech 
and prosecution. Politicians, in this case, were held to have to exercise greater responsibility 
than others when making comments which could lead to religious division. Lobba argues that 
the approach to incitement by the Court can be view as a ‘multi-faceted test’37 and argues that 
the case law on incitement is a good example of a more developed aspect of the Court’s article 
10 jurisprudence. Arguably, however, it has developed in volume rather than clarity. A greater 
focus on responsibility, as a key determinant, would aid developing a clearer approach, because 
of the way in which it links each of the criteria of pressing social need, likelihood of incitement 
to violence and the value of the contribution to the public debate.  
 
The question of the line between offensive speech and hate speech is a good example of the 
law developing in volume rather than clarity; yet the distinction between hateful and offensive 
speech has not really been made clearly by the Court. For example, in Leroy v France,38 an 
offensive cartoon which pictured the destruction of the twin towers captioned with a 
paraphrased Sony slogan (‘We all dreamt of it…Hamas did it’) was the subject of an article 10 
claim after the cartoonist was fined. The Court did not find a violation of article 10, as the fine 
was viewed as a reasonable restriction, despite there being no territorial link to the US nor any 
links to terrorism generally. Instead, the Court relied upon the criterion of disruption to the 
public, democratic order. Such a case undermines the clarity of the Court’s approach: if it is a 
contribution to the debate, albeit a tasteless contribution, which the Court acknowledges will 
                                                          
36  Erbakan v Turkey (App. No. 59405/00), judgment of 6 July 2006. 
37  P. Lobba, ‘Holocaust Denial before the European Court of Human Rights: Evolution of an  
Exceptional Regime’ (2015) 26 E.J.I.L. 237. 
38 Leroy v France (App. No. 36109/03), judgment of 2 October 2008. 
not incite violence, then why should a fine be permitted? The question of responsibility may 
have offered some clarity to the Court’s approach: the skilful drawing of a cartoon which could 
be rapidly shared around the world and potentially used in terrorist propaganda was 
unquestionably irresponsible, but arguably had little impact on the democratic order in France. 
A focus on responsibility would offer a degree of consistency: with Leroy, the Court appeared 
unable to articulate, in a justifiable fashion, why this form of expression ought to be limited. 
Noorlander notes that censure of certain anti-Islamic cartoons is problematic when 
considering freedom of speech,39 although he does not interrogate the role of cartoons in 
inciting violence, and there is no consideration in his work of responsibility regarding freedom 
of expression. Free expression, however, should include the rights of artists to produce the art 
they choose, as the appeal sometimes lies, as Rosler notes, in the appalling. 40 
 
Other cases raised against the French government demonstrate its firmer approach to 
offensive and hateful speech, one which is not always supported by the Court. In Giniewski v 
France,41 a journalist who had researched the connection between Roman Catholic doctrine 
and justifications for the Holocaust was convicted of hate speech. The Court held that any 
restrictions on publication in this instance would be a violation of article 10, primarily because 
the ideas were open to discussion. The Court also added another dimension to the question of 
responsibility, by holding that there was no gratuitous controversy created by the work, 
meaning that there was no ‘pressing social need’ to restrict such discussion.42 There is support 
for this approach in the literature, in that criticism of the State or other powerful organisations 
should not be restricted by article 10 unless there is a call to violence, whether veiled or 
obvious. 43 Moreover, if ‘doublespeak’ is being used, to disguise the intended message in the 
words, the State must demonstrate the intended meaning of the speech and prove the 
incitement to violence within.44 In a similar vein, in Lehideux and Isorni v France,45 the applicants 
complained of a breach of article 10 after they were convicted of publicly defending the crimes 
of an enemy State. The conviction was based on an advert they placed in a national newspaper 
                                                          
39 P. Noorlander, ‘In fear of cartoons’ (2015) 2 E.H.R.L.R. 115, 116. 
40 H. Rosler, ‘Caricatures and satires in art law: the German approach in comparison with the United States,  
England and the Human Convention on Human Rights’ (2008) 4 E.H.R.L.R. 463, 487. 
41 Giniewski v France (2007) 45 E.H.R.R. 23. 
42 Giniewski v France (2007) 45 E.H.R.R. 23, 50-51. 
43 H. Davis, ‘Lessons from Turkey: anti-terrorism legislation and the protection of free speech’ (2005)  
1 E.H.R.L.R. 75, 82. 
44  H. Davis, ‘Lessons from Turkey: anti-terrorism legislation and the protection of free speech’ (2005) 1  
E.H.R.L.R. 75, 82. 
45 (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 665. 
to stimulate debate regarding the actions of Pétain during the Second World War. The Court 
considered whether it was necessary in a democratic society, using the test of a ‘pressing social 
need’ to determine whether their convictions were a necessary State intervention. One of the 
key considerations was that they did not deny the facts of the Holocaust, nor was there any 
justifications of pro-Nazi policies, both of which would have been considered ‘remarks 
directed at the Convention’s underlying values,’46 and therefore unprotected by Article 10. 
Critically, the timing at which the debate took place affected the nature of the remarks, making 
it ‘inappropriate to deal with such remarks 40 years on, with the same severity as 10 or 20 years 
previously.’47 Indeed, it supported the debate of a country’s history ‘openly and 
dispassionately’48 and reiterated that article 10 protected both acceptable and palatable ideas, 
as well as those found shocking, disturbing and offensive.49 Although perhaps offensive, such 
speech was determined as lacking the hatefulness or incitement to violence required for a 
legitimate restriction under article 10. In both cases, France’s approach to expression 
connected to the Holocaust was viewed as overly restrictive, where no direct incitement to 
hatred could be found. 
 
Belavusau relies on the work of Sadurski to draw a distinction between incitement to hatred 
and incitement to violence, in that the former is the ‘emotional preparation’ for the latter,50 
referring to the repression of hate speech in Central and Eastern European countries as 
‘militant democracy.’51  There is clearly a distinction between incitement to violence and 
incitement to hate, as the former is used by the Court as a test to determine whether speech 
has been justifiably restricted. French restrictions, as shown above, tend to be among the 
strictest in Europe and any hint of discriminatory discussion is often censored. Indeed, Bob 
Dylan was able to emerge unscathed from an anti-hate action in France purely on a technicality: 
he had not authorised the publication of his remarks in France.52  During an interview with a 
magazine, he was questioned about the lasting effects of racism in the United States, and gave 
the following response:  
                                                          
46 (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 665, para 53. 
47 (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 665, para 55. 
48 (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 665, para 55. 
49  (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 665, para 55. 
 
50  U. Belavusau, ‘Hate Speech and Constitutional Democracy in Eastern Europe: Transitional and Militant  
(Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland)’ (2014) 27 I.L.R. 27, 45. 
51 U. Belavusau, ‘Hate Speech and Constitutional Democracy in Eastern Europe: Transitional and Militant  
(Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland)’ (2014) 27 I.L.R. 27, 61. 
I. Landauro and N. Bisserbc, ‘France Drops 'Hate Speech' Case Against Bob Dylan’ (15 April 2014) Wall 
Street Journal  https://www.wsj.com/articles/france-drops-hate-speech-case-against-bob-dylan-1397592733 [Accessed 5 
July 2019]. 
  
 ‘[i]f you got a slave master or Klan in your blood, blacks can sense that. That stuff lingers to this day. 
 Just like Jews can sense Nazi blood and the Serbs can sense Croatian blood.’53 
 
Although an unquestionably unorthodox and unscientific point, his opinion did not really 
speak of any hate towards a particular group of individuals. The French domestic court 
disagreed and raised an action against him for the dissemination of racist and hateful views. 
When it emerged that he had not authorised the publication in France, they continued to 
pursue his publisher, Michel Birnbaum. The nature of hate speech, as noted by Kiska,54 is that 
it may relate to intention, sometimes, and to effect, at others, depending on the jurisdiction in 
question. Customary international law provides little guidance: the unsettled nature of insulting 
or ‘mere hate speech’ in custom was noted by Meron in passing judgment before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, as cited by Clooney and Webb.55 Oetheimer notes 
that the media role is key, as they can become promoters of hate and violence very easily.56 He 
argues that there is an inner consistency to the Court’s work,57 although does not expound on 
what this may be. If there is a degree of consistency in its approach to hate speech, it is 
questionable as to where or when this is visible. Fines for certain offensive expressions which 
could incite are permitted, as in Leroy, whilst expression which does not directly incite violence, 
as in Molnar, but contextually could is held to be an unacceptable exercise of article 10, but 
restrictions in other situations, such as Gunduz, are considered violations of article 10 despite 
the clearly hateful nature of the discussion. Gunduz is particularly striking because of the extra 
context provided by the earlier, inadmissible case: the views of the interviewee were well-
known, and his intentions, in making certain statements, were not motivated by peace and 
tolerance. 
 
Cannie and Voorhoof cite Keane and note that he has exposed a two-tier approach in respect 
of hate speech: hate speech involving denial of the Holocaust or the Second World War is 
                                                          
53 J. Weinstein, ‘Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, and Political Legitimacy’ (2017) 32 Const. Comm. 527, 544. 
54  R. Kiska, ‘Hate Speech: A Comparison between the European Court of Human Rights and the United  
States Supreme Court Jurisprudence’ (2012) 25 Regent U.L.R. 107, 110. 
55  Nahimana et al. v The Prosecutor Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Meron, ICTR-99-52-A, 5 (JCTR  
Appeals Chamber Nov. 28, 2007) in A. Clooney and P. Webb, ‘The Right to Insult in International Law’ 
(2017) 48 C.H.R.L.R. 1, 21. 
56  M. Oetheimer, ‘Protecting Freedom of Expression: The Challenge of Hate Speech in the European Court  
of Human Rights Case Law’ (2009) 17 C.J.I.C.L. 427, 441. 
57  M. Oetheimer, ‘Protecting Freedom of Expression: The Challenge of Hate Speech in the European Court  
of Human Rights Case Law’ (2009) 17 C.J.I.C.L. 427, 443. 
usually restricted, as article 10 is rendered inaccessible through the application of article 17. 58 
However, there is little evidence to support this point. Although both forms of historical 
revisionism are usually restricted, the Commission previously justified restriction of Holocaust 
denial on the basis of the prevention of crime and disorder.59 In Refah Partisi, other restrictions 
were permitted because the applicants’ vision of plurality was too much in conflict with 
fundamental democratic principles.60 Cannie and Voorhoof make the point that the 
examination undertaken in Refah Partisi was based entirely on article 10, to determine whether 
there was a pressing social need to restrict their expression, which they note is not often the 
case in situations of Holocaust denial. They argue for a clearer formulation of the Court’s 
principles to explain when article 17 ought to be used and when there is a pressing social need 
for the expression to be restricted.61 This indicates that the articulation of a clearer approach 
is necessary, and that the discussion of responsibility is key: both cases demonstrate 
irresponsible exercise of freedom of speech, in contexts where the situation have previously 
or may currently become tense. When determining whether the individual has the right to 
exercise freedom of speech, responsibility is an incredibly useful measure which could allow 
the Court to clarify their tests, rather than relying on different tests in different contexts, 









                                                          
58  H. Cannie and D. Voorhoof, ‘The Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression in the European Human   
Rights Convention: An Added Value for Democracy and Human Rights Protection’ (2011) 29 N.Q.H.R.  
54, 55. 
59 H. Cannie and D. Voorhoof, ‘The Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression in the European Human   
Rights Convention: An Added Value for Democracy and Human Rights Protection’ (2011) 29 N.Q.H.R.  
54, 68. 
60 H. Cannie and D. Voorhoof, ‘The Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression in the European Human   
Rights Convention: An Added Value for Democracy and Human Rights Protection’ (2011) 29 N.Q.H.R.  
54, 75. 
61 H. Cannie and D. Voorhoof, ‘The Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression in the European Human   
Rights Convention: An Added Value for Democracy and Human Rights Protection’ (2011) 29 N.Q.H.R.  
54, 83. 
IV. Article 17 and hate speech 
 
Although genocide denial is criminalised in a significant number of countries,62 because of the 
way in which it is often used to resurrect Nazism, 63 the Court has a specific focus on genocide 
denial relating to the Shoah, the Jewish Holocaust. Whine argues that this is because denial of 
the Shoah links to a wider problem of incitement to hatred against Jews, which often leads to 
violence against Jewish individuals and institutions, undermining ‘fundamental concepts of 
civil liberty and fundamental rights.’64 Whine’s point is that Holocaust denial is intrinsically 
connected to a rejection of the system on which the modern system of human rights was 
founded. As such, there is a strong justification for restricting free speech where Holocaust 
denial is concerned, and explains the Court’s specific concerns regarding the Shoah: its 
inception is so closely linked to the Second World War and the atrocities committed by the 
Nazi government that a particularly strong line is taken regarding this sort of genocide denial 
or revisionism. As such, it would be blatantly irresponsible to allow similar atrocities to be 
committed by ignoring the connection between hate speech, historical revisionism, genocide 
denial, and the eventual genocide of the Jewish people during the Second World War. 
 
Kahn characterises any Holocaust denial in countries with ‘direct experience of Nazi rule, a 
form of hate speech’65 because of the way in which it seeks to separate survivors and their 
descendants from the rest of society. In the same volume, Pech notes the importance of article 
1766 as a method of precluding the exercise of any rights and freedoms under the Convention, 
including article 10, but notes that the Commission have often relied on the restrictions within 
article 10 to determine whether the speech ought to receive protection. Pech does not call for 
the denial of free speech across the board to those who reject established historical facts, nor 
does he note that these denials could be linked to incitement of hatred. This speaks to a general 
recognition, although not enunciated, of the importance of responsibility when exercising 
freedom of speech, and of the fact that exercising one’s freedom of expression in the medium 
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of hate speech, particularly in contexts of great historical suffering during the Second World 
War, could be completely irresponsible. The limited reach of the law is noted by Marshall and 
Williams, who argue that it is difficult to regulate holocaust denial because of the necessary 
impact such regulation has on freedom of speech.67 Their argument holds that the law is of 
limited value in this area, and that behavioural adjustments are required, such as education 
programme to change behaviour and attitudes. Such methods may increase personal 
responsibility in respect of making such statements in public, but they disregard the notion 
that the exercise of freedom of speech obligates the individual to act responsibly. Should the 
individual fail to do so, they may not exercise their freedom in that way without penalty or 
other repercussions 
 
Lobba does acknowledge that there is protection for the Court’s values and cites Janowiec68 as 
evidence of the Court’s ‘constant position’ that Holocaust denial, in particular, is not protected 
by article 10.69 However, there is little support in the jurisprudence for his notion that article 
17 is used to prevent the denial of international crimes. Indeed, some forms of hate speech are 
considered more problematic than others, with the Court taking measures to ensure that its 
values are protected from what it views as the greatest threats to democracy and human rights.  
Despite Williams and Cooper70 arguing that Holocaust denial is difficult to regulate, the Court 
has not struggled to deny article 10 rights to those who are convicted or found legally 
responsible through domestic civil prosecutions or similar proceedings. In X v Germany71 and 
T v Belgium,72 the parties were denied the protection of article 10 where they sought to deny 
the existence of the Holocaust. Thus, a violation of article 10 is less likely to be found by the 
Court where the individual authored the work on Holocaust denial, rather than simply engaged 
with those who deny or question the historical facts. X v Federal Republic of Germany73 concerned 
a member of a right-wing organisation who displayed pamphlets declaring the Holocaust a 
‘Zionistic swindle’ and stating that the death of six million Jews during the Second World War 
had been a ‘lie.’ The Commission acknowledged the restriction on freedom of expression, but 
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considered it justified on the basis that the reputation of others required protection against 
clearly defamatory statements. 74 It was thus appropriate to restrict freedom of speech under 
national law and the application was held to be manifestly ill-founded. Again, the question of 
responsibility is key: spreading untruths regarding an accepted, documented historical event 
does not contribute to debate and may not even incite violence, but it is not responsible 
behaviour in a country which previously experienced genocide, and which has not fully 
resolved its issues with anti-Semitism.75  
 
Similarly, editing and attempting to profit from ‘work’ on Holocaust denial was held to have 
been legitimately restricted in T v Belgium.76 The Commission noted that no benefit should be 
derived from such work, and that it was a proportionate interference with article 10 to restrain 
publication. Clooney and Webb note that the European Court is not alone in its decree that 
such restrictions are in keeping with the proper exercise of freedom of speech, as the UN 
Human Rights Committee is supportive of restrictions which prevent historical revisionism.77 
They note, accurately, that there is a flexible standard applied to hate speech, with a violation 
of dignity being the threshold in some cases, and incitement to violence in others.78 It could 
be argued that, in specific situations, the threshold for incitement to violence is lower, but the 
case law cited does not indicate that certain words are more likely to incite violence than others. 
Indeed, one particular case of restricted Holocaust denial was not considered a breach of article 
10 because the individual had insulted ‘the dignity of the deceased.’79 Their main concern is 
the use of article 17, which prevents the use of any Convention right to destroy the rights and 
freedoms of others under the Convention, as a concerning medium for the restriction of rights. 
Molnar80 provides justification for noting that certain complaints can be declared instantly 
inadmissible, without full analysis article 10.81 However, the Court still investigated the nature 
of the expression, holding: 
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 ‘Par leur contenu, ces messages visaient à instiguer à la haine contre ces minorités, étaient de nature à 
 troubler gravement l’ordre public et allaient à l’encontre des valeurs fondamentales de la Convention et 
 d’une société démocratique. Portant atteinte aux droits d’autrui, de tels actes sont incompatibles avec 
 la démocratie et les droits de l’homme de sorte qu’en vertu des dispositions de l’article 17 de la 




Authorship rather than dissemination of the views tends to be a deciding factor: in the Jersild 
case,83 a conviction concerning the broadcasting of Holocaust denial rather than the 
expounding of such views personally, was a violation of article 10 because of the connected 
press freedom issues. The Court held that punishing a journalist for broadcasting statements 
made by another during an interview would “seriously hamper the contribution of the press 
to discussion of matters of public interest and should not be envisaged unless there are 
particularly strong reasons for doing so.”84 
 
In cases concerning Holocaust denial, article 17 is key in supporting the restriction of 
dissemination or broadcast of such ideas. However, it is notable that there is little engagement 
with the concept of responsibility in article 10, given that holocaust denial and racist ideas, 
held up by their proponents as ‘the truth,’ are all dangerous and inappropriate exercises of 
article 10. Keane makes the point that Holocaust denial and general Second World War 
revisionism is dangerous to democracy.85 He also argues that the Lehideux case refers to events 
and their facts which are not part of a historical record the revision of which would destroy 
rights. 86 There is little if any evidence to support this point, as the approach by the Court to 
revisionism, as demonstrated here, is less than clear. Keane also supports the application of 
article 17 in situations where the acts aim to ‘spread violence or hatred, to resort to illegal or 
democratic methods, to encourage the use of violence, to undermine the nation’s democratic 
and pluralist political system, or to pursue objectives that are racist or likely to destroy the 
rights and freedoms of others.’ 87 Arguably this is exactly the problem generated by a lack of 
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explicit focus on the idea of responsibility: it would be sufficient to examine responsibility 
under article 10 when determining whether freedom of expression should be exercised. In 
Molnar, the link between the posters which held that Romania should ‘not become a country 
of Roma’ and the consequent likelihood of inflaming tensions and violence meant that the 
individual did not behave responsibly in wishing to express himself freely. Rather than 
discussing responsibility, the Court characterised such behaviour as incompatible with the 
rights and freedoms of others.88 
 
In Glimmerveen, the Commission held that article 17 existed to prevent totalitarian groups from 
exploiting the Convention for their own ends.89 It further commented that Holocaust denial 
was a special kind of hate speech, which could cause specific and unparalleled damage to 
European democracy.90 Consequently, article 17 is particularly relevant to article 10, as it 
prevents any act which aims to destroy Convention rights or to limit them in any way not 
envisaged by the Convention. In other words, Article 17 is the ultimate protector against the 
abuse of rights under the Convention. This has been interpreted by the Court and domestic 
authorities as, among other things, preventing hate speech. In the comparative study of hate 
speech laws undertaken by McGoldrick and O’Donnell, there was ample evidence shown of 
the wide variety of acceptable restrictions on genocide denial and the criminalisation of hate 
speech across multiple jurisdictions.91 Centrally, they argue, the use of article 17 has been 
limited to restrictions which were necessary in democratic society,92 and that future restrictions 
should be proportionate.93  
 
This does not mean, however, that article 17 has been restricted in its application. Indeed, it 
was upheld in Norwood,94 in which the defendant attempted ‘wordplay with the older Handyside 
judgment…contend(ing) that free speech should also be protected if it was ‘irritating, 
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contentious, eccentric, heretical, unwelcome and provocative.’95 However, the acts of the 
accused - involving the display of a racist poster declaring ‘Islam out of Britain Protect the 
British People’ - were held to be in direct conflict with the Convention, despite his argument 
that his expression did not incite violence. Buyse’s argument that that there is a trend towards 
using the balancing exercises within article 10, rather than relying on article 17 to declare the 
court inadmissible,96 is cogent, but only in the case of Holocaust denial and Second World War 
revisionism. As demonstrated above, there is a tendency for the Court to examine a Holocaust 
denial case under article 10, rather than relying on article 17 to declare it inadmissible. This did 
not ring true in Norwood, where the complaint appeared to be dismissed under article 17.   
 
Lobba notes that the Court has already agreed, in Gunduz, that racist or hate speech cannot 
be protected by article 10,97 and that Janowiec makes the point that any denial of crimes against 
humanity is in direct contravention of the values of the Convention.98 Despite a brief hiatus in 
Lehideux, he posits, article 17 is increasingly used to prevent any such denial, which he argues 
against as it undermines freedom of speech in order to preserve an ‘ill-defined’ moral order.99 
The point is compelling, and well-made, but it disregards the fact that the Court will examine 
the case under article 10 in situations of Holocaust denial rather than rely on article 17.  A 
notable case which was declared inadmissible, Remer v Germany,100 still examined the complaint 
under article 10, concluding that crime and disorder101 was another reason to prevent 
Holocaust denial, given the anger and disorder that it could provoke. Instead, situations 
relating to racial hatred tend to be more likely to be refused under article 17. Regardless, the 
approach remains inconsistent, and the lack of focus on responsibility is a significant problem. 
The missing link, despite being quoted directly as part of the text in article 10, is a discussion 
of responsibility, and the extent to which such behaviour is responsible. Such discussion would 
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V. Genocide denial and the concept of responsibility 
 
Let us now examine the question of responsibility in the context of the Court’s jurisprudence 
regarding freedom of expression and genocide denial. In Janowiec v Russia,102 the Court stressed 
that any denial of crimes against humanity would conflict with article 17. This is slightly 
different from the view taken in Lehideux and Isorni v France, which focused instead on whether 
the discussion was necessary in a democratic society. Similarly, in Perincek v Switzerland,103 the 
notion of whether the restriction was necessary in a democratic society was again prioritised, 
meaning that the denial of the Armenian genocide as a genocide was accepted. In this way, 
hate speech in respect of the Holocaust has been taken enormously seriously, while restrictions 
on the denial of other war crimes or genocide have generally been considered violations of 
article 10. This view has been reinforced in M’bala M’bala v France104, where it was held that 
Holocaust denial of the Shoah was an ‘ideology which goes against the fundamental values of 
the Convention.’105 The hard line drawn by France and Central and Eastern European States 
in respect of Holocaust denial has been respected by the Court, which has permitted further 
restrictions on freedom of speech where the speech is connected to denial of the Holocaust. 
This makes it harder to draw a definite line with the idea of contributing to the public debate. 
Janowiec demonstrates how the Court sees itself, by supporting the restriction of Holocaust 
denial while cloaking it in a wider rejection of free speech as a justification for the denial of 
any war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Lobba argues that this represents the 
‘redefinition’ of Article 1, ‘which now tends to cover the denial, justification and glorification 
of most of the core international crimes.’106 However, this is countered relatively easily by a 
brief examination of Perincek;107 the Court simply did not view genocides outside Europe as 
serious threats to democracy in the way that denying the Shoah was considered a direct aim at 
the heart of the system. 
 
Pegorier notes that there are few issues with limiting free speech where the speech concerns 
genocide denial, as this is such a grave denial that any attempt to do so should be 
criminalised.108 However, she acknowledges that there is a tendency in Europe to focus on the 
Holocaust as the most serious kind of hate crime denial, which has created an inconsistent 
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approach, citing Perincek and M’bala as evidence of this trend. Indeed, she argues that to 
broaden out the rejection of free speech in respect of other forms of Holocaust denial would 
not be to create an ‘equivalence,’ but rather to develop a more consistent approach to hate 
speech under freedom of speech law in Europe.109 Sottiaux states that the incitement standard 
is a ‘multi-faceted test’110 which means that the Court can survey a wide range of issues, 
including what was said, if there were any consequences and what the individual intended. This 
is a much clearer framework, in his eyes, than the previous democratic necessity approach. 
Nieuwenhuis argues against the restrictions on religious political parties,111 on the basis that 
moral values area not automatically contrary to the Convention. He also holds that pluralism 
is also clearly defined by the Court, by now,112 despite a lack of evidence for this point. 
 
The case law in this area demonstrates the Court’s approach to any attempts to counter the 
truth of the Holocaust. However, this approach is not, contrary to the view of Lobba,113 which 
represents a general response to the denial of any war crimes and crimes against humanity. The 
recent case of Perincek v Switzerland114 demonstrates the disparity of approaches depending on 
subject of denial, and the way in which the denial is expressed. Perincek concerned the 
expression of the Armenian genocide as an ‘international lie’ established by the ‘Great Powers’ 
to secure their own position.115 The Court did not consider such statements to incite hatred 
and held that any restriction on the expression of these ideas was to be considered a (prima 
facie) violation of article 10. Specifically, it noted the Swiss government’s limited margin of 
appreciation to interfere with such rights, and that the lack of a link between Switzerland and 
Turkey was sufficient to allow Perincek ‘heightened protection’ as an expounder of political 
views under article 10.116 The Court precipitated its conclusions, which were not supported by 
a number of judges, by indicating that previous Holocaust denial cases had been decided upon 
based on their specific contexts, rather than on the basis of a generally accepted principle. 
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In 2016, it was noted, that the Court’s approach to Holocaust denial was inconsistent.117 The 
comment on the Perincek case noted that the Court failed to agree that genocide denial, in 
general, should automatically permit restrictions on freedom of speech. Given the special 
consideration it gave to denials of the Shoah, to consider other forms of genocide denial less 
destructive or damaging, particularly where there was no geographical or cultural link between 
the country and the place of the genocide, was considered ‘questionable.’118 On the one hand, 
it can be seen that the Court is attempting to permit free speech unless there are significant 
reasons for curtailing it. On the other, to consider historical revisionism of any genocide 
acceptable is problematic, particularly when information can be disseminated quickly and 
broadly across the world. 
 
The Court’s response in this instance, and in particular its exclusion of article 17 as a reason 
for restricting article 10, demonstrates its approach to perceived threats to its existence. 
Although the Armenian genocide was accepted as historical fact by the Court, it did not 
generate the same reaction as the denial of the Holocaust would. Rather than a conspiratorial 
effort, it demonstrates the rejection of any support for State-sanctioned violence. Moreover, 
the historical roots of the European Court indicate that it is much more likely to take seriously 
threats to its existence which have been demonstrated by its history. Although the Armenian 
genocide is accepted as fact, it did not happen as part of a devastating European war and was 
not accompanied by a fascism which sought to destroy democracy in Europe. The Court’s 
view that certain forms of fascism ought to be more tightly controlled than others privileges 
the rights of certain deniers over others and ignores the dangerous common ground that such 
denials can create for those who reject human rights more broadly. 
 
The issue, therefore, of responsibility, is key at this juncture. To assume that the previous 
serious threats to democracy remain the current threats is to disregard the changing context in 
Europe and European politics. Instead of relying on article 17, the concept of responsibility 
offers a more nuanced approach to the question of restricting freedom of speech. It may also 
have help to prevent genocide denial in general, and more consistently, by acknowledging that 
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As shown above, both articles 10 and 17 of the Convention can be used to regulate hateful 
and offensive speech, particularly that of a racist nature. However, the issue of freedom of 
speech becomes more contentious, rather than less, because of the revival of right-wing 
political views across Europe and the associated revitalisation of Holocaust denial. While the 
roots of the Holocaust demonstrate the vulnerability of democracy and rights in Europe, it 
should not be assumed that this is the only threat to stable European societies: crimes against 
humanity and war crimes begin as ideas, and the dissemination of any racist and discriminatory 
views should be regarded as a threat. The European Court’s attempt to identify tests for 
freedom of speech, primarily the idea that only restrictions which meet a pressing social need 
because of the likelihood that they incite violence, is problematic because of the associated 
requirement of public debate. The current climate requires the engagement with extreme right-
wing views, specifically because they are of such interest to many. However, it is not necessary 
to feed into complaints of intolerance of views alternative to a liberal, rights-based discourse 
by continually reverting to article 17 to silence such hate. A fuller conceptualisation of what is 
meant by responsibility within article 10 would address these issues, while providing a timely 
reminder that democracy requires of all its adherents responsible engagement. 
 
 
